

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 R

66611
DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR/REG:PSEMLER
APPROVED BY: ACDA/IR/REG:TJHIRSCHFELD
EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR
S/S-SFRY

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R 120054Z APR 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT VIENNA 3246 ACTION SECSTATE INFO SECDEF
APR 10.

QUOTE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 VIENNA 3246

EXDIS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN POSITION

REF: VIENNA 2003

I. SUMMARY

1. NOW THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS IS NEARING A CLOSE, IT IS DESIRABLE TO
MOVE TOWARD DEFINING AN OVERALL STRATEGY FOR DEVELOP-
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MENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND A TIMETABLE FOR

THAT STRATEGY. IN ITS PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT, THE NEGOTIATION TASK CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR MAJOR COMPONENTS: (A) PHASING; (B) US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS; (C) THE COMMON CEILING; AND (D) ASSOCIATED MEASURES. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO GET MOVEMENT ON THE FIRST THREE OF THESE MAJOR COMPONENTS AND REQUESTS A NUMBER OF DECISIONS TO THIS END. IT ALSO MAKES SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TIMING AND RAISES THE TACTICAL ISSUE OF WHETHER TO EMPHASIZE ONE OR A COMBINATION OF THESE COMPONENTS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

II. PRESENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

2. SINCE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS IN JANUARY, THE ALLIES HAVE GIVEN PRIORITY TO GETTING THE EAST TO DEFER WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ACCEPT A FIRST PHASE OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS ONLY. TO ACHIEVE THIS TACTICAL OBJECTIVE, THE ALLIES HAVE TRIED TO BRING THE EAST TO AGREE TO SEPARATE THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED AT THE OUTSET FROM THE ISSUE OF WHAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE AND TO GIVE PRIORITY TO DECIDING THE FIRST ISSUE. THIS OBJECTIVE WAS CHOSEN IN ORDER TO DEFINE A FIRST STEP TOWARD MOVING ONTO THE TERRAIN OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL SMALL ENOUGH FOR THE EAST TO CONSIDER ACCEPTING IT.

3. TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO EXPLOIT EASTERN INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPEAN, PARTICULARLY BUNDESWEHR, REDUCTIONS BY INDICATING THAT THERE WOULD BE SUCH REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE IF THE EAST AGREED TO LIMIT THE FIRST PHASE TO US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SIGNS OF MOVEMENT IN THE EASTERN POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE ALLIED TACTICAL GOAL AND ITS ACHIEVEMENT IS STILL CONSIDERED FEASIBLE.

4. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS THE EAST ON THE OTHER MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE

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ALLIED POSITION: THE CONTENT OF THE PHASE I REDUCTION PROGRAM, THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES HAVE DEVELOPED CERTAIN LEADS IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, THE EAST HAS NOT AS YET SHOWN INTEREST IN ENTERING INTO ACTIVE NEGOTIATION ON ANY OF THEM. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE TALKS IS ASSESSED IN THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT OF APRIL 5 (TEXT IN VIENNA 2973) AND IN

VIENNA 2972.

5. THE NEXT SECTIONS OF THIS MESSAGE DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW TO GET MOVEMENT ON THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF PHASING, PHASE I REDUCTIONS AND COMMON CEILING. EACH IS TREATED SEPARATELY. ASSOCIATED MEASURES ARE ALSO COVERED. THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING AND TACTICS WITH WHICH THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES COULD BE ADVANCED IS TREATED IN A LATER SECTION.

III. HOW TO GET MOVEMENT ON PHASING

6. IN OUR VIEW, THE ALLIES HAVE MADE IT UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THE ONLY WAY TO GET WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS, IS THROUGH PRIOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. HOWEVER, THE ALLIES HAVE NOT YET BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING THE EAST THAT IT WOULD HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF ACTUALLY OBTAINING WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION IF WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WERE POSTPONED TO SUCH A SECOND PHASE. TO DO SO, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES WILL AT A MINIMUM IN OUR VIEW HAVE TO GIVE THE EAST CONVINCING ASSURANCES THAT: (A) WEST EUROPEAN MANPOWER WILL NOT BE INCREASED BETWEEN PHASE I AND PHASE II; (B) PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WILL START WITHIN A REASONABLE AND SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME; (C) THE BUNDESWEHR WILL BE REDUCED IN PHASE II; AND (D) THE EAST WILL NOT HAVE ACCEPTED A UNILATERAL DISADVANTAGE IF NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN PHASE II.

7. AN AFFIRMATIVE ALLIED POSITION ON ALL FOUR
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ISSUES DESCRIBED ABOVE MAY BE THE MINIMUM NEEDED TO BRING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY A TWO-PHASE APPROACH. IF ACHIEVED, THIS AGREEMENT MIGHT MERELY TAKE THE FORM OF INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING TO DESIST FROM PUSHING FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WHILE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. ALTHOUGH THIS MOVE WOULD REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION FROM THE EASTERN VIEWPOINT, NONE OF THE WESTERN CLARIFICATIONS SUGGESTED IN THIS CONNECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. TO MEET THE FIRST OF THE REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN PARA 6 ABOVE, THE DELEGATION REQUESTS AUTHORITY BY MAY 10 TO COMMENT TO SOVIET REPS BI-

LATERALLY "THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INFORMAL EASTERN SUGGESTIONS OF A FREEZE ON MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES AND THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING SUCH A COMMITMENT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OTHERWISE SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT IF THE SOVIETS WOULD INDICATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DEFER REDUCTIONS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION." THIS ISSUE IS FURTHER DISCUSSED IN VIENNA 1706.

9. THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD WISH TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH A PHASE I AGREEMENT HAD BEEN COMPLETED BUT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WERE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. TO MEET THIS CONCERN, THE ALLIES HAVE SAID THAT THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WITHIN AN AGREED FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER THE PHASE I AGREEMENT BECAME EFFECTIVE. THE ISSUE OF THE DURATION OF THIS PERIOD IS BEFORE THE NAC. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED TO WASHINGTON A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR TO 18 MONTHS (VIENNA 1206). WE WILL NEED A DECISION ON THIS ISSUE FROM THE NAC BY MID-MAY.

10. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO POSTPONE WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS TO PHASE II UNLESS THEY RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT
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WESTERN EUROPEANS, PARTICULARLY THE FRG, WILL COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE IN PHASE II. THIS POSITION HAS SOME LOGIC, AND THE EAST WILL DOUBTLESS CONTINUE TO INSIST ON IT. THEREFORE, WE REQUEST AUTHORITY BY MAY 10 TO INFORM THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY THAT "WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS AND THAT, IN THE EVENT OF AN OTHERWISE SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, THERE COULD BE A PROVISION IN THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WHICH MADE THIS CLEAR." BACKGROUND ON THIS ISSUE IS CONTAINED IN VIENNA 1509.

11. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE FREQUENTLY POINTED OUT THAT, EVEN IF THE ALLIES/SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE WEST EUROPEAN FORCES IN PHASE II, THERE WOULD BE NO ASSURANCE THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE OUTCOME. THEREFORE, THEY WISHED TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE THEY HAD AGREED TO PHASE I IN EXPECTATION OF FRG REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, BUT THIS GOAL WAS FRUSTRATED. EASTERN REPS HAVE ASKED HOW THERE COULD BE ASSURANCE OF A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF

PHASE II. ALLIED REPS HAVE SAID THAT A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A COMMITMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING AND COULD ALSO SPECIFY THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF SUCH A CEILING, THUS ESTABLISHING SOME DEGREE OF JOINT WESTERN COMMITMENT TO THE OUTCOME OF PHASE II. WE HAVE ALSO TOLD THE EAST THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT ALSO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

12. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THESE POINTS WILL MEET SOVIET CONCERNS. IF THEY DO NOT, WE SEE TWO POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO AGREE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I WITHDRAWALS COULD BE STAGED, WITH A PORTION COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE START OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE REMAINDER COMPLETED WHEN AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN PRINCIPLE ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV HAS SUGGESTED SOME SUCH POSSIBILITY. ONE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGE OF THIS PROCEDURE IS THAT US PHASE I WITHDRAWALS WOULD ALSO

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HAVE TO BE STAGED. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO INCLUDE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT A PROVISION THAT WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT AFTER A FIXED PERIOD, SAY 5 YEARS, IF A PHASE II AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED. THESE ARE THE ONLY CONTRACTUAL SOLUTIONS THUS FAR APPARENT. WE REQUEST A WASHINGTON DECISION BY MAY 10 THAT WOULD PERMIT US TO INDICATE BILATERALLY TO THE SOVIETS READINESS TO DISCUSS ONE OR THE OTHER OF THESE POSSIBILITIES TO ASSIST IN OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE TWO-PHASE CONCEPT.

IV. HOW TO GET MOVEMENT ON US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS

13. THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY INDICATED THAT THEY ARE UNWILLING TO SERIOUSLY DISCUSS REDUCTIONS IF THESE ARE CONFINED SOLELY TO ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED SO AS TO PERMIT SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER STONE-WALLING ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WILL MERELY FURTHER POSTPONE SERIOUS EASTERN CONSIDERATION OF ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. HENCE, OUR WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN OUR REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED PROMPTLY INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS STAGE. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO MAXIMIZE THEIR LEVERAGE FROM OPTION 3 THROUGH INTRODUCING IT IN A NUMBER OF SEPARATE STEPS, OF WHICH THE FIRST COULD BE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE

TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN REDUCTIONS, WHILE OTHER STEPS COULD DRAW ON THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE PACKAGE ITSELF. EACH OF THESE STEPS WOULD BE USED TO TRY TO OBTAIN SOME SPECIFIC SOVIET CONCESSION. IN THIS SENSE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE ALLIES SEEK TO USE WESTERN ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN WESTERN REDUCTIONS AS AN INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATING CHIP ON ITS OWN, SEPARATE FROM THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF OPTION 3, TO OBTAIN A SPECIFIC SOVIET CONCESSION. THE RETURN CONCESSION, WE SUGGEST, MIGHT BE SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO ACCEPT A SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRICAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET GROUND SECRET

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FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS.

14. WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND, WE RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED BY THE END OF MAY TO INFORM THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT THAT "THE US MIGHT BE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN US WITHDRAWALS IF THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE THAT IN PHASE I THERE WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRICAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS." WE WILL HAVE RECOMMENDATIONS AT A LATER POINT AS TO HOW THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF OPTION 3 MIGHT BE USED TACTICALLY.

15. THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY DIRECTLY LINKED THEIR MOST IMPORTANT NEGOTIATION LEVERAGE, SOVIET INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS, ESPECIALLY BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS, WITH THE EAST'S AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING. ALL WESTERN REMARKS CONCERNING PHASE I PROVISIONS HAVING TO DO WITH THE SECOND PHASE HAVE BEEN MADE CONDITIONAL ON EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING.

16. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REJECTED THE APPROXIMATELY 3-TO-1 REDUCTIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING AS HIGHLY INEQUITABLE. HOWEVER, JUDGING FROM THEIR INFORMAL REMARKS, THE SOVIETS WILL APPARENTLY NOT INSIST THAT WESTERN MANPOWER REDUCTIONS PRECISELY EQUAL THE EAST'S NUMERICALLY, AS LONG AS THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE TWO IS NOT TOO LARGE. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE, BOTH FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN DATA AND FROM WHAT LITTLE THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID OF DATA THEMSELVES, THAT A DISCUSSION OF DATA WITH THE SOVIETS MIGHT ENABLE US TO FIND ACCEPTABLE WAYS TO NARROW THE

NUMERICAL GAP BETWEEN ESTIMATES OF PACT AND NATO FORCES, AND THUS MAKE IT EASIER TO GET SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING. WE BELIEVE THAT, AFTER THE RECESS, WE SHOULD INITIATE A DISCUSSION ON DATA BILATERALLY, WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING SECRET

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IT INTO THE MULTILATERAL INFORMAL SESSIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS MAY BE MORE WILLING TO ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION OF DATA IF WE BREAK THE ICE BILATERALLY.

17. TO DEVELOP THIS DISCUSSION CONVINCINGLY, WE NEED NATO AGREEMENT BY MAY 15 AT THE LATEST ON THE NATIONAL BREAKDOWN OF CURRENTLY VALID TOTALS OF NATO AIR AND GROUND FORCES.

18. IN CONNECTION WITH DATA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF NARROWING THE NUMERICAL GAP, WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES STUDY (A) WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ELIMINATE ALL STRATEGIC GROUND AIR DEFENSE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES FROM THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL (I.E., THE GROUND FORCE COMPONENT OF POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE NOW COUNTED IN THE ARMY AND THE BELGIAN STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE). WE BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE ALONE. (B) WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO CONTINUE TO EXCLUDE EASTERN HELICOPTER UNITS FROM THE TOTAL OF EASTERN GROUND FORCES ALTHOUGH WE HAVE INCLUDED HELICOPTER UNITS IN NATO GROUND FORCES. IF THE ANSWER TO BOTH OF THESE QUESTIONS IS "YES" AND ONE INCLUDES IN THE COMPUTATION THE FACT THAT NATO HAS ABOUT 20,000 MORE (FRG) GROUND PERSONNEL THAN THE ALLIES HAVE TOLD THE EAST THUS FAR, THE OVERALL DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES MIGHT GO DOWN TO ABOUT 80,000. THERE ARE OF COURSE PROS AND CONS IN BOTH CASES CITED, BUT WE WILL NEED POSITIONS ON THIS SUBJECT IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WITH THE EAST. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON THESE TWO TOPICS BY THE END OF MAY.

19. THE SOVIETS HAVE IN THE PAST INFORMALLY INDICATED POSSIBLE INTEREST IN THE COMMON CEILING IF IT INCLUDED AIR FORCE MANPOWER. IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS IN THE INTEREST OF ADVANCING THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT TO AGREE TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER ALTHOUGH FOCUSING ON ACTUAL WITHDRAWALS OF SECRET

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SOVIET GROUND MANPOWER. WE THEREFORE REQUEST AUTHORITY TO INDICATE BILATERALLY, IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN, THAT "WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO LOOK INTO INCLUDING AIR FORCE MANPOWER IF THE SOVIETS WOULD GIVE US POSITIVE INDICATION OF INTEREST IN THE COMMON CEILING." WE SUGGEST AIMING AT A DECISION ON THIS BY THE END OF MAY. IF THE SOVIETS SHOWED SIGNS OF MOVEMENT ON THIS POINT, WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THE FOCUS OF REDUCTIONS TO REMAIN ON GROUND FORCES.

20. WHEN THE ALLIES GET INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING WITH THE SOVIETS, THE LATTER WILL ASK ABOUT THEIR OWN PARTICIPATION IN THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING. AND, EVEN IF THE ISSUE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II IS RESOLVED IN PRINCIPLE, THE SOVIETS WILL WISH TO AVOID BEING PLACED IN A SITUATION DURING PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WHERE PRESSURE WILL BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THEM AGAIN TO WITHDRAW A NUMBER OF FORCES THEY REGARD AS EXCESSIVE.

21. ASSUMING SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II WILL BE REGARDED AS A POLITICAL NECESSITY BY THE US AND BY THE ALLIES, WE CALCULATE THAT TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN PHASE I, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO OFFER THE SOVIETS SOME QUID PRO QUO BEYOND THE POSSIBILITY OF PHASE II BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS, BOTH FOR THEIR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II, AND FOR THEIR SHARE OF THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING.

22. WESTERN MOVES IN THIS CONNECTION MIGHT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES: (A) AGREEMENT BY THE US TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II. US PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FOR THE ADDITIONAL REASONS OF MAINTAINING THE IMPORTANT BURDEN-SHARING ASPECTS OF MBFR AND OF MEETING CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SIZE OF THE US REDUCTIONS. (B) SOME WAY OF INDICATING THAT THERE WOULD BE A LIMIT ON THE DEMANDS THAT

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WILL BE MADE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWALS IN PHASE II. AN EXAMPLE MIGHT BE THAT THE US WOULD NOT DEMAND THAT THE SOVIETS REDUCE MORE THAN TEN PERCENT OF THEIR FORCES REMAINING

AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS; (C) A PROVISION IN THE PHASE I AGREEMENT (POSSIBLY A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION) COMMITTING WEST EUROPEANS NOT TO INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD OFFSET US REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN PHASE I. IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PRESS FOR AN OVERALL NUCLEAR FREEZE ON THE WESTERN EUROPEANS AS PART OF ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE ALLIES WILL HAVE TO HAVE SOME ANSWER FOR THIS. THE COMMITMENT SUGGESTED, WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO THAT PORTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH THE US REDUCES, ALLOWS A GLOBAL QUOTA FOR THE WHOLE OF NATO AND WOULD BE LIMITED IN TIME IF THE DURATION OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WERE LIMITED, APPEARS TO BE THE MINIMUM FEASIBLE RESPONSE. (D) SOME INDICATION THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MAKING FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. POINTS (C)) AND (D) SHOULD OBVIOUSLY ONLY BE MADE AFTER THE CONTENT OF OPTION 3 HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO NEGOTIATION.

23. IT IS CLEAR WESTERN MOVES ON THESE LINES WOULD ENTAIL MANY PROBLEMS. BUT TO ATTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING AND TO THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING, THE WESTERN COMPENSATION WILL HAVE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO SOVIET INTERESTS WHILE LEADING TO A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IN OUR TERMS.

24. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE ISSUES POSED ABOVE WITH REGARD TO ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COMMON CEILING RECEIVE PRIORITY STUDY. WE ESTIMATE THAT IT WILL NEED AUTHORITY BY THE END OF JUNE (OR EARLIER, IF IT IS DESIRED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE COMMON CEILING) TO INDICATE BILATERALLY TO THE SOVIETS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING AND OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS, THAT "THE US IS READY IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE
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IN SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS, AND THAT IT MIGHT BE WILLING TO PUT SOME REASONABLE UPPER LIMIT ON REDUCTIONS EXPECTED FROM THE SOVIETS IN PHASE II IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO COMMON CEILING."

25.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, TROOP REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE075808
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/IR/REG:PSEMLER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740086-0108
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740444/aaaabnri.tel
Line Count: 484
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: VIENNA 2003
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <07 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN POSITION
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: NATO
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005